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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN NONLEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING
ARAM A. GAVOOR*
DANIEL MIKTUS**
I. INTRODUCTION
THE present state of administrative law allows for members of the pub-lic to be the subject of arbitrary governmental enforcement proceed-
ings based on regulations that are promulgated by an unelected and semi-
accountable government bureaucracy.  Many of these rules are of a non-
legislative nature, issued without advance notice to the public or public
participation.  There is no clear authority to facially challenge the legality
of these rules through the ability to petition.  Even if Article III review is
available, the federal courts apply inconsistent standards of review.
Federal lawmaking must be based on congressional enactments or ad-
ministrative interpretations of congressional enactments.1  The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) provides general authorization for
administrative agencies to promulgate legally binding regulations.2  To en-
sure that individuals remain able to participate in the legislative process
when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agencies, the APA re-
quires that agencies follow specific procedures when issuing legally bind-
ing rules, including publication of any proposed rule, opportunity for
public comment on the rule, and publication of the rule prior to its effec-
tive date.3
This same mandate, however, exempts agencies’ “interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure,
* Professorial Lecturer of Law, The George Washington University Law
School.  Thanks to Dick Pierce, Lisa Schenck, and Steven Schlossberg for their
guidance and advice.  The views expressed in this article are solely the views of the
authors.
** J.D., George Mason University, B.A., Saint Joseph’s University.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
472 (2001); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408–09
(1928).
2. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(current version codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012)).
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also generally U.S. CONST. art. I–II.
(759)
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[and] practice” (collectively, nonlegislative rules) from these public partic-
ipation procedures.4  Although nonlegislative rules are exempt from these
requirements because they do not carry “the force of law,”5 agencies none-
theless tend to promulgate nonlegislative rules that are of a legislative na-
ture that impart legal duties and impose legal consequences on
individuals.6  This agency practice is antithetical to the system of represen-
tative government and leaves individuals with no opportunity to partici-
pate in the promulgation of binding regulations.  The problem is
exacerbated upon considering the quantity of regulations federal adminis-
trative agencies promulgate, how agencies are increasingly choosing to is-
sue nonlegislative rules over legislative rules, and the fact that the
Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to apply Chevron deference to
longstanding nonlegislative rules.7
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
5. See William Funk, When Is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between
Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 659–60 (2002)
(“Legislative rules have the force and effect of law.  Nonlegislative rules do not.”).
6. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manu-
als, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311, 1332–55 (1992) (listing numerous legal challenges to nonlegislative rules
used to initiate enforcement proceedings against individuals).  For a recent news-
worthy example of such a nonlegislative rule that can be used, at least in part, to
initiate enforcement proceedings, see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV.,
Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Apr. 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K8MG-N24N]; see also, e.g., Wolfe v. AGV Sports Grp., Inc., Civil No. CCB 14–1601,
2014 WL 5595295 (D. Md. Nov. 3, 2014); Xuedan Wang v. Hearst Corp., No. 12 CV
793(HB), 2013 WL 3326650 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice
Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
159, 167 (2000) (observing nonlegislative rules still establish “the law for all those
unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer the ill-will of challenging the agency in
court”).
7. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2002) (citing Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984));
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995); see also MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING,
TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 1, 6, 19
(2015) [hereinafter COUNTING REGULATIONS] (noting “the number of final rules
published each year is generally in the range of 2,500–4,500” and that in most
recent year for which data is available, 2014, agencies published 3,554 final rules in
Federal Register, spanning 24,861 pages).  In contrast, the 113th Congress, sitting
between January 2013 and 2015, enacted just 296 laws and 663 resolutions. See
Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/CJE7-MV93] (last visited December 5,
2015).  However, of the 3,554 final rules issued by agencies in 2014, only eighty
were considered “major rules,” as defined by the Congressional Review Act. See 5
U.S.C. § 804(2) (2012); COUNTING REGULATIONS, supra, at 7–8; see also Peter L.
Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an
Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2001) (noting that between 1975 and
1977, Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued guidance documents “in a volume
dwarfing the regulations”); Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing
2
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A curative, yet underutilized, salve for this agency behavior lies in the
petitioning provision of APA § 553(e) (the Petition Provision or § 553(e)),
which requires agencies to give individuals “the right to petition [the
agency] for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”8  While the law
is well tread on the point that agencies must permit interested persons to
submit petitions regarding legislative rules, courts and commentators disa-
gree as to whether agencies must accept and adjudicate petitions for non-
legislative rules from the regulated public.9  There is no consensus
regarding which procedures, if any, an agency must follow when it receives
a petition either for legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking under
§ 553(e).  If agencies are either not required to accept petitions regarding
nonlegislative rules or may elect to simply ignore or perpetually delay ad-
judicating such petitions, the outcome would be a regulatory system where
agencies could promulgate rules, even those with the force of law, without
public participation.  The negative effect of this repetitious scenario is am-
plified by the fact that there is no clear right of judicial review of certain
agency actions regarding petitions.  Even when such review is available,
the federal courts employ inconsistent standards to evaluate both agency
inaction and unreasonable delay in adjudicating a petition.  This was not
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution or the drafters of the
APA, both of whom envisioned a system where the public should partici-
pate in crafting federal law, and where the courts should be the final arbi-
ter of the legality of those laws.
This Article examines three aspects of the APA’s Petition Provision.
First, it analyzes how agencies can effectively prevent the public from play-
ing any role in the promulgation of nonlegislative administrative rules.  It
explains that the language, structure, context, and legislative history of
§ 553(e) uniformly provide that individuals must be permitted to petition
administrative agencies for the enactment, amendment, or repeal of all
informal rules of both a legislative and nonlegislative nature.
Next, it analyzes how agencies vary in their handling of § 553(e) peti-
tions, frustrating the goal of encouraging procedural uniformity in agency
rulemaking.10  It argues that Congress intended that agencies would con-
Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 785 (2010) (“Guidance docu-
ments greatly outnumber legislative rules . . . .”).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
9. For an argument that APA § 553(e) applies to both legislative and nonleg-
islative rules, see Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of
Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2011).  For an argument that APA
§ 553(e) applies only to legislative rules, see Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Benefi-
ciaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007).
10. Because the APA does not contain explicit instructions for agency consid-
eration and responses, agency practice varies considerably. See ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 86-6: PETITIONS FOR
RULEMAKING 1 (Dec. 4, 1986), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/86-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJS2-KNBT] [hereinafter ACUS RECOM-
MENDATION 86-6].  However, the Seventh Circuit has held that, because “[t]he APA
does not detail procedures for petitions,” an agency “does not violate the APA by
3
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sider and respond to all petitions.  Moreover, agencies are required to ad-
judicate such petitions, either by granting or denying the relief requested
without unreasonable delay.  Third, it explores whether and under what
circumstances agency inaction, unreasonable delay, and denials of
rulemaking petitions are subject to Article III review.  It details the often
inconsistent standards of review employed by the federal courts when ana-
lyzing agency inaction and unreasonable delay.  It argues that courts
should employ a consistent standard of review, the D.C. Circuit’s TRAC
test, when analyzing alleged agency inaction and unreasonable delay.  It
observes that the issue of review of agency denials of rulemaking petitions
is complex, though such review should be available in limited
circumstances.
Critics suggest that adopting these suggestions will divert scarce re-
sources from important agency goals,11 lead to the issuance of irrational
rules that are lacking, and sometimes even at odds with, expert knowl-
edge,12 and increase the likelihood of “industry capture” of agencies.13
Yet, there is no evidence that permitting nonlegislative rulemaking peti-
tions or requiring agencies to respond to petitions will significantly in-
crease the number of petitions received by agencies.  There is similarly no
evidence to suggest that petition-initiated rules tend to address any less
important issues than those initiated by agencies.  At least one study on
the effects of regulatory capture suggests that capture is not as common or
likely as it once was thought.14  Petitions can lead agencies to address mat-
not having detailed procedures governing petitions.” See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v.
Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 41 (1950), superseded by statute, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, as stated in Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 502 U.S. 129 (1991); 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-6 (1986) (“An Administrative
Conference study of agency rulemaking petition procedures and practices found
that while most agencies with rulemaking power have established some procedures
governing petitions for rulemaking, few agencies have established sound practices
in dealing with petitions or responded promptly to such petitions.”).
11. See Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review
and Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 294, 301 (2015) (noting “the com-
monly held belief that petitions tend to divert agencies’ attention from more im-
portant issues and waste limited agency resources”); see also Eric Biber & Berry
Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Infor-
mation in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 323–24 (2010) (noting “an
overly generous petition process is blamed for the near demise of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in the 1970s”).
12. See Biber & Brosi, supra note 11, at 324 (“[O]verly broad public participa-
tion can lead to irrational regulation that is inconsistent with an expert
assessment . . . .”).
13. See Bull, supra note 11, at 287; see also Biber & Brosi, supra note 11, at 331
(“[T]he scholarly literature portrays a well-intentioned public participation tool—
the petition—as easily manipulated to undermine the very regulatory programs
that it was intended to benefit.”).
14. Rather, one study provided evidence that individual participation either
had no effect or had very little effect on agency priorities, the quality of rules
issued, or the occurrence of agency capture. See Biber & Brosi, supra note 11, at
4
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ters that they had previously abdicated.15  Accordingly, there is either no
evidence to support these criticisms, or there is countervailing evidence
suggesting that they are unfounded.16
The dramatic growth of administrative agencies and the increase in
rulemaking is, in part, a response to an increasingly complex set of
problems.17  In light of the expansion of administrative power, it is acutely
important for the public to have a say in the rules that agencies are pro-
ducing, and to have a reasonable means of seeking facial redress of such
rules and the procedures used to promulgate them.  The Constitution and
the APA amply demonstrate the value that the Framers and Congress re-
spectively placed on public participation in the creation of federal law and
the role of the judiciary in reviewing federal law.18  Because nonlegislative
364 (analyzing rules promulgated by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and surmising
that “there is no reason to conclude that widespread use of petitions will necessa-
rily result in diverting an agency fundamentally from a rational or systematic
agenda-setting process—even when the process is dominated by one particular
viewpoint or ‘special interest’”).  The study noted that petitions seemed even bet-
ter at identifying at-risk species that would cost little to restore. But see David Moss
& Daniel Carpenter, Conclusion: A Focus on Evidence and Prevention, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 451, 452
(David Moss & Daniel Carpenter eds., 2013) (suggesting while empirical evidence
regarding regulatory capture remains scarce, it is becoming less so, and that “[t]he
old Stiglerian notion of a fully captured regulator is most likely a rarity, if it exists
at all.  In fact, in recent years, the most searching analyses have cast doubt on some
of the most celebrated cases of Stiglerian capture”); Ernesto Dal Bo´, Regulatory
Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 220 (2006) (“The empirical
evidence on the causes and consequences of regulatory capture is scarce.”); David
Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 (2014)
(“[E]mpirical results demonstrate many examples of regulatory capture generat-
ing results contrary to the public interest . . . .”).
15. See Biber & Brosi, supra note 11, at 323.
16. Even if adopting these recommendations would require additional agency
resources, the means justify the ends. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy,
Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 5, 13 (2009) (“In a democracy, it makes sense to look for ways for
affected parties to participate in the creation of governing norms both because (a)
democracy presupposes that transparency and participation are good things in
themselves; and (b) one might reasonably hope that exposing agency proposals to
informed comment would, generally speaking, improve agency rulemaking.”).
17. See JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE
POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59 (2012) (“The act allowed reformers to offer a
coherent approach to the dozens of agencies and commissions, each of which pos-
sessed its own messy and complicated history, institutional structure, and political
context.”); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (citing Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254,
2266 (2011); Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012)) (“[T]he danger posed
by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”); Cynthia
R.S. Schiesswohl, Judicial Autonomy in the Immigration Adjudicatory System, 21 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 743, 748 (1996) (quoting Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1994)).
18. See Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and
Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 92 (2007) (“APA rulemaking
as supplemented by judicial review over the procedural and substantive aspects of a
5
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rules were not intended to carry the force of law,19 courts should rely on
the language, structure, and legislative history of the APA to uphold the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of all rules.  A
similar inquiry concludes that the APA requires agency adjudication of
every petition submitted under § 553(e), and that it provides for judicial
review when agencies fail to act on, or unreasonably delay in, adjudicating
a petition.  Courts should uniformly utilize the D.C. Circuit’s TRAC test
when analyzing inaction or unreasonable delay claims.  Though generally
unavailable, courts should conclude that judicial review of agency denial
of a rulemaking petition is not per se unreviewable.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND RULEMAKING
The Petition Provision of the APA, § 553(e), was intended to assuage
at least two of Congress’s main concerns during the pre-1946 administra-
tive state.20  For that reason, it is important to examine the conditions and
concerns that led Congress (among others) to pursue sweeping regulatory
reform.  The APA has been referred to as the “bill of rights for the new
regulatory state.”21  It set the rules for interactions among agencies, indi-
viduals, and courts in the regulatory arena.22  A durable statute, it has sel-
dom been revised, receiving only three substantial amendments since its
enactment.23  The statute was the legislative outcome of the “nation’s deci-
final rule does, as a practical matter, compensate for the absence of political
checks that are a central feature of the legislative process.”).
19. See Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1045, 1047 (2000) (“[A]lthough it does not have the force of law, the new
position laid down in such a document will often have practical binding effect upon
private parties.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 345 (“Often, however, agencies will
adopt policy statements or interpretive rules that in practice bind regulated
entities . . . .”).
20. See James Hunnicutt, Note, Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory
System: Agencies’ Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 153,
153–54 (1999) (“Congress passed the APA to foster clarity, uniformity and public
participation in the administrative state.”).
21. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996); see also Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 237 (1946).
22. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1558 (“[T]he APA established the funda-
mental relationship between regulatory agencies and those whom they
regulate . . . .”).
23. See William H. Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA.
L. REV. 235, 236 (1986) (noting substantive amendments include Freedom of In-
formation Act in 1966, Privacy Act in 1974, and Government in the Sunshine Act
in 1976); see also FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 1 (William
Funk, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, & Charles Pou, Jr., eds., 4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK] (The APA, “as originally enacted, was re-
pealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (September 6, 1966), as part of the
general revision of title 5 of the United States Code.  Its provisions were incorpo-
rated into the sections of title 5 . . . .”).  Also note that a 2013 bill seeking to amend
the APA did not amend the Petition Provision’s language. See generally Regulatory
Accountability Act, H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. (2013).
6
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sion to permit extensive government, but to avoid dictatorship and central
planning.”24
A. Administrative Law Prior to the APA
Administrative law existed long before the APA.  Congress established
the first federal administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC), in 1887 by enacting the Interstate Commerce Act.25  By the
start of the twentieth century, Congress had created about one-third of all
currently existing federal agencies, and by 1930, the number of agencies
reached approximately two-thirds of today’s number.26  In response, com-
prehensive administrative procedure reform became a prevalent issue.  A
1933 American Bar Association (ABA) report found major issues with the
administrative state, including the new and increasingly substantial powers
in the executive branch that were not subject to judicial review.27  While
the ABA report suggested possible legislative solutions such as codifying
more stringent rules, authorizing greater judicial review, and establishing
an administrative court,28 this first major attempt at reforming administra-
tive law was unsuccessful, as were numerous subsequent attempts at re-
form.  Although congressional attempts to reform administrative law
appear as early as 192929 and 1933,30 the momentum for broad reform
came in 1938.31  Some viewed administrative reform as a debate about
24. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1559.
25. See Mark F. Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending? The Interstate Com-
merce Commission and the Emergence of the Post-Enlightenment Paradigm, 113 PENN ST. L.
REV. 113, 130 (2008); see also Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379,
383 (1887); Susannah T. French, Comment, Judicial Review of the Administrative Re-
cord in NEPA Litigation, 81 CALIF. L REV. 929, 933–34 (1993) (noting ICC was first
administrative agency); CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, A Brief History of Administrative
Government, FOREFFECTIVEGOV.ORG, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461
[https://perma.cc/S23S-3Q6L] (“The first of these so-called economic regulatory
agencies was the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . . established in 1887 . . . .”).
26. See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence
in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 19 n.127 (2006).
27. See generally REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
1933 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 408 (1933) [hereinafter 1933 REPORT] (noting other issues
such as threat to ABA attorneys’ large clients posed by administrative state and
threat to livelihood of lawyers from creation of “administrative tribunals”); see also
Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1571 (“The increasing importance of administrative
tribunals appeared to elite lawyers to threaten the lawyers’ livelihoods by diminish-
ing the importance of lawyers and traditional lawyering.”).
28. See 1933 REPORT, supra note 27, at 426–27.
29. See S. 5154, 70th Cong. (1929) (the Norris Bill); see also Kali Murray, First
Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 29, 49 (2008).
30. See S. 1835, 73d Cong. (1933) (the Logan Bill); see also 1933 REPORT, supra
note 27.
31. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 683 (2010) (noting that by 1938,
Republicans and conservative Democrats began to gain more political ground); see
7
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“the most efficient administrative procedures.”32  It was actually a struggle
between New Deal supporters and its opponents who feared the greater
powers given to agencies.33
In 1939, President Roosevelt directed the Attorney General to estab-
lish a committee to recommend administrative reforms34 and asked Con-
gress to postpone any legislation “until the [ ] [c]ommittee completed its
report.”35  The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure’s Final Report, completed in 1941,36 contained two proposed bills.37
The liberal majority bill sought to impose minimal restraints on agencies,
while the conservative minority proposal contained a comprehensive
“Code of Standards of Fair Administrative Procedure” and sought to im-
pose stringent limits on agencies.38  Even after publication of the Attorney
General’s Final Report, Congress did not enact comprehensive administra-
tive procedure reform for some years, instead choosing to focus efforts on
the ongoing war.39
World War II played a large role in the eventual enactment of the
APA.  To manage the war effort properly, agencies were given “broad new
powers” and “increased authority,”40 but no central rules placed any
checks on the agencies’ new powers.  As the political influence of Demo-
crats diminished and the war abroad became the President’s main focus,
President Roosevelt relented on his New Deal policies to “‘ensure industri-
alists’ cooperation’ in the war effort.”41  Some believe that the President’s
domestic concessions may have caused congressional Republicans to simi-
also Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1586 (“In 1938 . . . [t]he country was ripe for
administrative procedural reform.”).
32. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1595.
33. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 4 (5th
ed. 2012); see also Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1606, 1608, 1611 (noting reform
proponents stressed administrative reform should include “protection of individ-
ual rights” from New Deal policies, while reform opponents believed supporters
intended only to promote “big business’s interests at individuals’ expense”).
34. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 1.
35. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1628.
36. See U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL RE-
PORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC.
NO. 77-8 (1941) [hereinafter 1941 AG’S REPORT].
37. See id. at 191–216. Compare S. 674, 77th Cong. (1941), with S. 675, 77th
Cong. (1941).  The Attorney General’s 1941 Final Report recommended including
a petition provision, and Congress specifically considered this recommendation.
See Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary on the
Subject of Federal Administrative Procedure, 79th Cong. 78 (1945); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 79-1980, at 236–38, 245, 254, 258, 260, 284–85, 287 (1946); ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 2 (describing role of public in rulemak-
ing process).
38. See 1941 AG’S REPORT, supra note 36, at 1–127, 191, 203–50; see also Shep-
herd, supra note 21, at 1633–34.
39. See Kovacs, supra note 31, at 693.
40. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1641.
41. See Kovacs, supra note 31, at 694 (quoting Shepherd, supra note 21, at
1643).
8
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larly concede their demands for tight administrative regulations.42  More-
over, President Roosevelt appointed a large number of liberal federal
judges who were “less likely” to invalidate New Deal regulations, reducing
Republicans’ desire for “broad judicial review” of agency action.43  These
two factors increased the likelihood of congressional compromise on ad-
ministrative reform.  Finally, Francis Biddle, who served on the Attorney
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, then served as Attor-
ney General from 1941 through 1945 and “helped to push reform
along.”44  After unanimous passage in the House of Representatives and
the Senate, on June 11, 1946, President Truman signed the APA into
law.45
In debates concerning reform, Congress acknowledged that the fed-
eral courts would be afforded broad flexibility in interpreting any eventual
legislation.46  Because legislative history regarding administrative reform
was scarce,47 various groups attempted to “create” legislative history by
compiling a record for courts to interpret the statute, sometimes causing
various reports to suggest alternative interpretations of the same provi-
sion.48  For instance, the 1945 Senate Judiciary Committee Report49 and
the 1947 Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act50 suggested diverging explanations of the APA’s original Petition Pro-
42. See id. at 694 (positing President Roosevelt’s “retreat may have deflated
the drive for strict administrative controls”).
43. See id.  President Roosevelt appointed 204 federal judges during his presi-
dency. See Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts
.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/judgeship-appointments-president
[https://perma.cc/9G3Z-KEML] (last visited Dec. 12, 2015).
44. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1647.
45. See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Legislative Background of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCIES 1, 12 (George Warren ed., 1947).
46. See 92 CONG. REC. 2159 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (“There-
fore, it will be the duty of the reviewing courts . . . to determine the meanings of
the words and phrases used, insofar as they have not been defined in the bill it-
self.”); William S. Jordan III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combina-
tion, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 313 (2009) (noting “[d]evelopments in the wake of the
APA” suggest Congress did “not intend the courts to defer to agency decisions”).
47. See Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1663 (discussing how legislative history did
not exist because “[t]he bill had sprung not from public debate in Congress, as
other bills had, but from months of private, off-the-record negotiations”).
48. Compare S. REP. NO. 79-752 (1945) [hereinafter 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY RE-
PORT], with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter 1947 AG’S MANUAL]; see also
Shepherd, supra note 21, at 1662–63, 1665 (noting Senate Committee interpreted
bill as imposing tighter controls on agencies, whereas Attorney General believed
bill simply “states existing law”).
49. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48.
50. See 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48.
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vision, § 4(d) (the precursor to § 553(e)).51  While the Senate Committee
Report interpreted the Petition Provision as requiring an agency either to
grant or deny each petition or “undertake public rule making proceed-
ings” for a petition,52 the Attorney General’s Manual left open the possi-
bility that an agency could simply not respond to a petition.53  This, as well
as other, conflicting interpretations concerning vague APA provisions per-
sist today.
B. The Building Blocks of APA Legislative and Nonlegislative Rulemaking
and the Petition Provision
The contemporary APA contains two major parts: §§ 551 through
559, outlining general “agency procedures,” and §§ 701 through 706,
“dealing in general with judicial review” of agency action.54  Sections 551
through 559 are divided into two categories, rulemaking and adjudica-
tion.55  Rulemaking is defined as the “agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule,”56 and a rule is “the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”57
Agency rules have a similar legal effect as congressionally-enacted stat-
utes.58  While specific types of rulemaking procedures are not explicitly
delineated in the APA, courts have construed the APA as providing proce-
51. Original APA § 4(d) stated that “[e]very agency shall accord any inter-
ested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule.” See Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 4(d), 60 Stat. 237, 239 (1946).
52. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 201.
53. See 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 128 (stating § 4(d) “requires the
reception and consideration of petitions, but does not compel an agency to under-
take any rule-making procedure merely because a petition is filed”).  Another such
ambiguity that received conflicting interpretations pertained to whether a petition
denial would be subject to judicial review. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra
note 48, at 201, 230 (discussing Senate Judiciary Committee interpretation and
Attorney General’s Appendix interpretation).
54. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 2.
55. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012); see also LUBBERS, supra note 33, at
44 (“[T]he entire Act is based upon a dichotomy between rule making and adjudi-
cation.”).  For general information regarding adjudication, see John F. Stanley,
Note, The “Magic Words” of § 554: A New Test for Formal Adjudication Under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1067 (2005).  APA § 552 contains the famil-
iar Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
57. Id. § 551(4). But see generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 208–09 (1988) (holding agencies can adopt rules with retroactive application
pursuant to explicit statutory authorization).  For more information regarding ret-
roactive agency rules, see Geoffrey C. Weien, Note, Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 749 (2007).
58. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 2–3 (stating
rulemaking “regulates the future conduct of persons, through formulation and
issuance of an agency statement designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy,” and that “[i]t is essentially legislative in nature”); see also Morrison, supra
10
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dures for two separate types of rulemaking, generally referred to in the
case law and literature as legislative and nonlegislative rulemaking.59
In addition to the delineation between legislative and nonlegislative
rulemaking, the APA provides for two types of legislative rulemaking, for-
mal and informal.60  Formal rulemaking is a rarely used and largely de-
funct method of agency statutory interpretation; under APA § 553(c),
when an agency rule is “required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 [ ] apply[,]” and
a rulemaking is considered to be formal.61  It involves a “trial-type hear-
ing” where agencies and adverse parties introduce evidence and conduct
oral examinations.62
Until the late 1970s, agencies assumed that they must conduct most, if
not all, rulemakings via these formal procedures.63  However, formal
rulemaking was less than ideal.  Generating formal rules was costly and
inefficient, and formal agency rules were often unclear or contradictory.64
Moreover, agency goals became dependent upon rules generally applica-
ble to the public at large, rather than rules that were applicable only to the
parties involved in a particular formal rulemaking proceeding.65  In 1973,
note 18, at 89 (“Like a statute, once a rule is in place, it must be obeyed unless a
court overturns it or the agency revokes it.”).
59. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203–04 (2015);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Funk,
supra note 5, at 659–60.  These terms do not appear in the APA itself. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551–559.
60. See 5 U.S.C § 553(c). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553, with 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557.
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 23, at 5 (stating formal rulemaking is “required only where the statute
involved specifically requires an ‘on the record’ hearing” (citing United States v.
Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973))).
62. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (stating formal rulemaking “must include a trial-type hearing at which a
‘party is entitled to present his case or defense or oral or documentary evidence, to
submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be re-
quired for a full and true disclosure of the facts’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(d))).
But see Amanda Swanson, 510(k) Clearance: Opportunities to Incentivize Medical Device
Safety Through Comparative Effectiveness Research, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 117, 130
(2013) (“Although in theory these formal procedures may provide the best way to
ensure affected parties are afforded due process . . . the reality is that these formal
procedures are incredibly time consuming and inefficient.” (citing KENNETH F.
WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 220 (2004))).  Swanson
provides an illustration of such inefficiency. See id. (“One hearing, which focused
on whether peanut butter should contain 87.5 percent or 90 percent peanuts, pro-
duced a weighty 7,736-page transcript and lasted about nine years.”).
63. See Rakoff, supra note 6, at 163 (noting that for this reason, “[d]uring the
1950s and 1960s, most major regulation took place through formal adjudicatory
proceedings”).
64. See id. (stating “[t]he reality was that agencies refrained from making rules
they would have to justify with trial-type proof,” and that “the law that could be
extracted from agency decisions often proved to be vague or contradictory”).
65. See id. at 163.
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the Supreme Court held in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.66
that the ICC’s view that its authorizing statute required it to issue all regu-
lations through formal rulemaking was incorrect.67  The Court concluded
that the informal rulemaking procedures of § 553 applied to the ICC.68
This same interpretation has been extended to most agencies, thus signal-
ing the dominance of informal rulemaking.69
Informal rulemaking does not require the type of courtroom-style ad-
judications associated with formal rulemaking.70  As noted above, the APA
implicitly creates two types of informal rules: legislative and nonlegisla-
tive.71  Legislative informal rules refer to those agency promulgations that
are intended to have “the force and effect of law”72 and require public
“notice and comment” procedures.73  Nonlegislative informal rules, which
generally include agencies’ “interpretive rules, general statements of pol-
icy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice,”74 are not sup-
posed to carry any force of law,75 and are exempted from public notice
and comment procedures.76
With regard to informal legislative rulemaking, APA § 553(a) exempts
certain subjects, including “military and foreign affairs function[s]” and
agency personnel decisions, from its requirements.77  Subsection (b) pro-
vides that a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) must be published in
the Federal Register, and that the NPRM must describe when and where the
rulemaking proceedings will take place, the “legal authority under which a
66. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
67. See id. at 227–28.
68. See id.
69. See Rakoff, supra note 6, at 163 (stating informal rulemaking described in
Fla. E. Coast Ry. “would suffice for most agencies,” and that “[t]he upshot of these
developments was a surge of administrative rulemaking”).
70. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
71. See id. § 553(c).  The APA does not label these two types of rules as such,
but courts and commentators have come to refer to them this way. See Jacob E.
Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (2007) (“The dis-
tinction between legislative rules and interpretive rules predates the APA, and the
statutory text could be read to implicitly incorporate the preexisting doctrinal dis-
tinction.” (footnote omitted)).
72. See Funk, supra note 5, at 659–60.
73. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(d).
74. See id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
75. See Funk, supra note 5, at 659–60.
76. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (“[T]his subsection does not apply . . . to
interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice . . . .”); see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct.
1199, 1201 (2015) (“Because an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment
procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those
procedures when it amends or repeals that interpretive rule.”).
77. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1)–(2) (“This section applies, according to the pro-
visions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved[:] (1) a military or for-
eign affairs function of the United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts.”).
12
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rule is proposed . . . and either the substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the substance and issues involved.”78  Section 553(b) also
lists two scenarios when the procedures prescribed in subsection (b) will
not apply.79  An NPRM is not required before an agency adopts nonlegis-
lative rules.80  Section 553(b)’s exception for nonlegislative rules forms
the basis for the distinction between legislative informal rulemaking and
nonlegislative informal rulemaking.81
Section 553(c) provides that after an agency issues an NPRM, the
agency must provide “interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through [the] submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments.”82  This section creates the public comment period for proposed
legislative rules and, when combined with § 553(b)’s requirement of an
NPRM, forms what is known as “notice and comment rulemaking.”83  Sec-
tion 553(c)’s language is generally interpreted to exclude nonlegislative
rules from the notice and comment requirement because an NPRM is not
required for these types of rules by subsection (b).84  Section 553(c) then
provides that after considering any relevant public comments, an agency
must “incorporate in the rule[ ] adopted a concise general statement of
[the rule’s] basis and purpose.”85  As noted above, § 553(c) also provides
the distinction between formal and informal rulemaking procedures, stat-
ing that the procedural requirements of § 556 and § 557, rather than
§ 553, apply to formal rulemaking.86
78. See id. §§ 553(b)(1)–(3).
79. See id. §§ 553(b)(3)(A)–(B) (“Except when notice or hearing is required
by statute, this subsection does not apply[:] (A) to interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”).
80. See id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
81. Professor Jacob E. Gersen notes, however, that “[t]he distinction between
legislative rules and interpretive rules predates the APA, and the statutory text
could be read to implicitly incorporate the preexisting doctrinal distinction.” See
Gersen, supra note 71, at 1710 (footnote omitted).
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
83. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In a sense, notice-and-com-
ment procedures serve as a Congressionally mandated proxy for the procedures
which Congress itself employs in fashioning its ‘rules,’ as it were, thereby insuring
that agency ‘rules’ are also carefully crafted . . . .”).
84. See 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 28 (stating subsections (a) and
(c) “must be read together because the procedural requirements of subsection
[(c)] apply only where notice is required by subsection (a)”); Seidenfeld, supra
note 9, at 371 n.212 (“[T]here is a consensus that the comment requirement in
subsection (c) does not apply to such [guidance] documents.”).  Note that subsec-
tion 4(b) of the public law referred to in the Attorney General’s Manual corre-
sponds to subsection 553(c) of the APA.
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
86. See id. (“When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead
of this subsection.”); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 247
13
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Section 553(d) provides that agencies must publish any “substantive
rule” at least thirty days prior to it becoming effective.87  In addition, sub-
section (d) excludes from its coverage “interpretative rules and statements
of policy.”88  Accordingly, nonlegislative rules need not be published prior
to going into effect.  Thus, APA § 553(b) provides the distinction between
informal legislative rulemaking and nonlegislative rulemaking, also known
as interpretive/interpretative, procedural, or policy statements.89  The
procedural requirements of § 553, including publication of an NPRM, a
public notice and comment period, and publication of a rule at least thirty
days prior to its effective date, do not apply to agencies’ nonlegislative
rules.90
Determining whether a prospective rule is a substantive legislative
rule subject to § 553’s procedural requirements, or a nonlegislative rule
exempt from those requirements, can be a difficult task for courts and
agencies alike.91  While legislative rules are considered legally binding on
persons, a violation of which can subject an individual to “civil or criminal
penalties,”92 nonlegislative rules are not considered legally binding in that
they do not impose legal obligations on individuals.93  Nonlegislative rules
“function largely as guidance documents,” providing the public, agency
personnel, and courts with an idea of how a certain law “should be inter-
preted.”94  They can also specify how the agency “intends . . . to exercise
(1973) (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (stating § 556 applies when rule is statu-
torily required to be made on record and after hearing).
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
88. See id. § 553(d)(2).
89. See id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
90. See id. §§ 553(b)(3)(A), (c), (d)(1)–(2).
91. See Gersen, supra note 71, at 1705 (“The distinction between legislative
rules and nonlegislative rules is one of the most confusing in administrative law.”).
92. See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321,
1322 (2001) (“[V]iolations of these rules can subject a person to civil or criminal
penalties.”); see also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (“An agency action that purports to impose legally binding obligations or
prohibitions on regulated parties—and that would be the basis for an enforcement
action for violations of those obligations or requirements—is a legislative rule.”);
Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 334 (“[A] [legislative] rule is a mandate by the govern-
ment with which entities subject to the rule are commanded to comply, often upon
threat of sanction.”).
93. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 252 (“[A]gency action that merely inter-
prets a prior statute or regulation, and does not itself purport to impose new obli-
gations or prohibitions or requirements on regulated parties, is an interpretive
rule.”); Funk, supra note 92, at 1322; Funk, supra note 5, at 659. But see Rakoff,
supra note 6, at 167 (“If an agency, without promulgating a nominally-legally-bind-
ing regulation, generates a set of detailed guidelines for its inspectors to enforce, it
in effect still establishes the law for all those unwilling to pay the expense, or suffer
the ill-will of challenging the agency in court.”).
94. See Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
43, 44 (1992); see also Sean Croston, The Petition Is Mightier Than the Sword: Redis-
covering an Old Weapon in the Battles over “Regulation Through Guidance”, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 381, 382–83 (2011) (“[M]eaningful guidance . . . is essentially equivalent to
free legal advice for parties confronted with complex legal requirements . . . [and]
14
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[the] discretion” afforded to it by a statute or other substantive rule.95
Very little is required for an agency to adopt a nonlegislative rule, to the
point where there may be no notice to or “input” from the public.96  The
APA requires only that agencies publish nonlegislative rules in the Federal
Register upon promulgation.97
Nonlegislative rules may carry more legal force and effect than in the
past because in practice they have evolved into a mechanism for agencies
to more quickly and easily promulgate rules that have direct legal effects
on individuals.98  The Supreme Court has even indicated a willingness to
afford Chevron deference to nonlegislative rules.99  In Barnhart v. Wal-
ton,100 the Court concluded that “the fact that the [a]gency previously
reached its interpretation through means less formal than ‘notice and
comment’ rulemaking . . . does not automatically deprive that interpreta-
tion of the judicial deference otherwise its due.”101  Agencies promulgate
vastly more nonlegislative rules than legislative rules,102 predominantly be-
cause they are incentivized by the relative procedural simplicity and cost
advantage associated with the former.103  As a result, it is more difficult for
potentially reduces an agency’s burden of replying to repeated stakeholder re-
quests for individual interpretations of particular regulations.” (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. See Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 334.
96. See id. at 342 (“[A]n agency may issue [a nonlegislative rule] with no input
even from those with strong interests in it.”).
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2012).
98. See Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Re-
thinking the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 377 (2008) (noting nonlegisla-
tive rules have become “process-free vehicles for agency declarations of explicit
standards and principles that have a real, direct, and potentially devastating im-
pact”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 6; Anthony, supra note 19, at 1047
(noting “practical binding effect” of nonlegislative rules); Croston, supra note 94, at
382–83; Raso, supra note 7, at 789 (stating nonlegislative rules may “have the effect
of altering [regulated parties’] conduct”).
99. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in
pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the
case . . . .”); NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 260–63 (1995) (affording Chevron deference to Comptroller of Currency’s in-
terpretation of National Bank Act).
100. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
101. Id. at 221 (citation omitted).
102. See COUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 7, at 1, 6, 19 (noting “the number
of final rules published each year is generally in the range of 2,500–4,500,” and
that in the most recent year for which data is available, 2014, agencies published
3,554 final rules in the Federal Register, spanning 24,861 pages).  In contrast, the
113th Congress, sitting between January 2013 and 2015, enacted just 296 laws and
663 resolutions. See Statistics and Historical Comparison, supra note 7.  However, of
the 3,554 final rules issued by agencies in 2014, only eighty were considered “major
rules,” as defined by the Congressional Review Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2012);
see also COUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 7, at 8 tbl.2.
103. See Croston, supra note 94, at 384; see also Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007) (“Because it is proce-
15
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the regulated public to challenge nonlegislative rules in the federal courts
because agencies can argue either that a nonlegislative rule is not final104
or is not ripe for review.105  Accordingly, nonlegislative rules that actually
have a significant legal impact may, and often do, completely “escape judi-
cial review.”106
APA § 553(e), the focus of this Article, provides that “[e]ach agency
shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.”107  While this provision states that agen-
cies “shall” receive such petitions, Congress did not enact any uniform
standards for the handling of such petitions.108  To the contrary, legisla-
tive history suggests that individual agencies were expected to prescribe
procedural rules governing how to handle petitions.109  Few agencies have
specific guidelines regarding the submission, receipt, and consideration of
§ 553(e) petitions.110
The phrase “interested person” has been interpreted broadly, to the
point that many agencies have determined that “any person may petition”
durally easier to issue guidance documents, there also may be an incentive for
regulators to issue guidance documents in lieu of regulations.”).
104. Agency action can be challenged in court only when specifically pro-
vided by statute, or when the action is considered “final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” See 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Nat’l
Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)) (“An agency action is final only if it is both ‘the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process’ and a decision by which
‘rights or obligations have been determined’ or from which ‘legal consequences
will flow.’”); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
105. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 940 F.2d 679,
680 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (determining challenge to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion’s policy statement was unripe); see also Croston, supra note 94, at 386.
106. See Anthony, supra note 6, at 1318 (“[F]or practical reasons [nonlegisla-
tive rules] may escape judicial review altogether.”).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). But see California Sea Urchin Comm’n v. Bean, Case
No. CV 14-8499-JFW (CWx), 2015 WL 5737899, at *6 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2015)
(noting “the APA does not provide for partial repeal of a rule”).
108. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION 86-6, supra note 10, at 1 (“[U]niform specifi-
cation of agency petition procedures would be undesirable because there are sig-
nificant differences in the number and nature of petitions received by agencies
and in the degree of sophistication of each agency’s community of interested
persons.”).
109. See 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 38 (stating agencies were ex-
pected to “establish[ ] and publish . . . procedural rules governing the receipt,
consideration, and disposition of petitions”); see also 92 CONG. REC. 5651 (1946)
(“Every agency possessing rule-making authority will be required to set up
procedures . . . .”).
110. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION 86-6, supra note 10, at 1 (“[T]here are signif-
icant differences in the number and nature of petitions received by agen-
cies . . . .”).  However, the Seventh Circuit has held that because “[t]he APA does
not detail procedures for petitions made pursuant to § 553(e),” an agency “does
not violate the APA by not having detailed procedures governing petitions.” See
Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1983).
16
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for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.111  However, courts still
require petitioners to establish standing before attempting to challenge
final agency action such as a denial of a § 553(e) petition.112  The APA
does not define the word “petition,” but courts have accepted oral peti-
tions in addition to written requests under § 553(e).113
Courts and commentators disagree about whether § 553(e)’s right to
petition extends to informal legislative and nonlegislative rules, or simply
to legislative rules.114  Disagreement exists about agency obligations in
handling petitions, and to what judicial recourse individuals may avail
themselves when an agency either denies or unreasonably delays adjudi-
cating a petition.115  Even among the courts that have permitted judicial
review of an agency’s inaction or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a
petition, the standards of review used to analyze such challenges are not
conclusively established.116  Accordingly, the APA’s Petition Provision con-
tinues to perplex the regulated public, agencies, lawyers, and the courts.
APA sections 701 through 706 describe the availability of judicial re-
view of agency action or inaction, and the procedures applicable to such
judicial proceedings.117  Section 702 provides the general right of judicial
review to any person who has suffered a legal wrong or who was adversely
111. See Jason A. Schwartz & Richard L. Revesz, Petitions for Rulemaking: Final
Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States 11 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://
www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Fi-
nal%20Petitions%20for%20Rulemaking%20Report%20%5B11-5-14%5D.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LYU-YUQK].
112. See, e.g., Brown v. FBI, 793 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating
APA “will not automatically confer Article III standing” on all petitioners).
113. See, e.g., Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (noting APA does not “specif[y] formalities for a rulemaking petition”); see
also Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 24 (“The APA does not define ‘petition’
or provide any details in § 553(e) on required content.”).
114. Compare Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 370–71 (“[T]he language and struc-
ture of § 553 in its entirety clearly indicates that § 553(e) applies to [nonlegislative
rules] . . . .”), with Mendelson, supra note 9, at 439–40 (“Despite some commenta-
tors’ statements that the language of the APA supplies an obvious right to file such
a petition under section 553, the few courts to opine on the issue have flatly and
unanimously disagreed, finding that no right to petition an agency to revise or
repeal an interpretive rule or policy statement exists under current law.” (footnote
omitted)).
115. See infra Sections III and IV.
116. See infra Section IV.
117. Section 701, the definitional section for agency review, asserts that the
APA’s judicial review provisions apply, “except to the extent that[:] (1) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).  Agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law “where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply.’” See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at
26), abrogated sub nom. on other grounds by Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974).
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affected by agency action.118  “‘Agency action’ includes the whole or a
part of an agency rule[ ] [or] order . . . [a] denial thereof, or [an
agency’s] failure to act.”119  Section 704 limits § 702’s broad general right
of review to only those agency actions explicitly made reviewable by stat-
ute, or “final agency action for which there is no other adequate [judicial]
remedy.”120  Accordingly, if a statute does not specifically make an agency
action reviewable, the action cannot be subject to judicial review unless it
is considered “final.”121  Determining whether an agency action is “final”
is often a difficult question.122
Section 706 details the scope of review available for final agency ac-
tions, requiring courts to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
plicability of the terms of an agency action.”123  A reviewing court “must
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed[ ] and
hold unlawful and set aside [any] agency action[s]” found to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”124
III. THE PETITION PROVISION APPLIES TO LEGISLATIVE AND
NONLEGISLATIVE RULES
The APA’s right to petition applies to legislative and nonlegislative
rules alike.  Agencies must “give an interested person the right to petition
118. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).  The APA provides a gen-
eral waiver of sovereign immunity from such suits.
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal
authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an
indispensable party.
Id.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
120. See 5 U.S.C. § 704.
121. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990).  Moreover,
§ 704 forbids judicial review of “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action.” See 5 U.S.C. § 704.
122. See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371–72 (2012); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (noting that agency action “must not be of a
merely tentative or interlocutory nature”); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758
F.3d 243, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“An agency action is final only if it is both the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process and a decision by which
rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will
flow.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78)).
123. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
124. See id.; see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting “that in
their application to the requirement of factual support the substantial evidence
test and the arbitrary or capricious test are one and the same”).
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[the agency] for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”125  Some
courts have appeared to suggest, and commentators have argued, that
§ 553(e) applies only to legislative rules.126  However, the Petition Provi-
sion’s language, structure, context, and legislative history indicate that the
right to petition applies to all administrative rules.  Accordingly, any inter-
ested person is entitled to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal
of any rule.
Though the issue has been addressed infrequently and in passing,
courts and commentators have yet to delve into the question of whether
§ 553(e) applies to nonlegislative rules.127  Of the scarce scholarly re-
search available regarding this question, the general view, shared by this
Article’s authors, concludes that § 553(e) applies to nonlegislative rules.
One scholar argues that “[b]ecause guidance documents clearly are rules
under the APA,” § 553(e) must apply to nonlegislative rules.128  Other
scholars note that “the right to petition extends beyond traditional legisla-
tive rules with general policy effects.”129  However, another scholar indi-
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
126. See Mendelson, supra note 9, at 439–40 n.227 (citing Nat’l Wrestling
Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d on
other grounds, 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co.
v. Pen˜a, 44 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1994); United Transp. Union v. Del. & Hudson Ry.,
Co., 977 F. Supp. 570 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)).
127. A few courts and scholars have quickly passed over this question, men-
tioning without specific analysis of the issue that § 553(e) either applies to nonleg-
islative rules or that it does not. See LUBBERS, supra note 33, at 73; Asimow, supra
note 94, at 44 n.5 (“All rules, legislative and nonlegislative, are subject to the right
of an interested person to petition . . . .”); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemak-
ing and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 424 (“[T]he public can create the [ ]
burden under existing law by petitioning . . . .”); Royal C. Gardner, Public Participa-
tion and Wetlands Regulation, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 21 (1991) (noting
“petition[ing] the agency to reconsider or repeal its pronouncement” is one
method of public redress); William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for
Rulemaking: An Overview of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommenda-
tions for Improvement, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (“[T]he APA petition process en-
compasses not only so-called legislative or substantive rules . . . but also procedural
rules, interpretative rules and general statements of policy.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Mendelson, supra note 9, at 439–40 n.227 (and cited cases);
Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 371–72 (stating issue of whether § 553(e) applies to
nonlegislative rules has not been judicially resolved); Schwartz & Revesz, supra
note 111, at 12 (“[I]t seems unlikely that a court would find the APA requires any
specific agency official to follow any specific procedure in considering
petitions . . . .”).
128. See Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 370–71.
129. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 27; see also LUBBERS, supra note
33, at 73 (noting nonlegislative rules are “not exempt from section 553’s petition
provision”); Asimow, supra note 94, at 44 n.5 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)); Asimow,
supra note 127, at 424; Gardner, supra note 127, at 21 (“Although the public may
not challenge an agency’s statement of policy or interpretative rule for lack of
public notice and comment, individuals aggrieved by such rules [may] . . . petition
the agency to reconsider or repeal its pronouncement.”); Luneburg, supra note
127, at 13–14 (citing 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 38) (“[T]he APA peti-
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cated that no right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of
nonlegislative rules exists under current case law.130
Case law on the topic is similarly scarce and often conflicting.  Some
cases opine or observe that § 553(e) does not apply to nonlegislative
rules.131  However, the statements in these cases are dicta, omitting any
consideration of the text, structure, context, and legislative history of
§ 553(e).132  Notably, the D.C. Circuit has observed in dictum, in line with
the Authors’ views, that § 553(e)’s right to petition applies to nonlegislative
rules.133  The court stated that, even if a nonlegislative rule were reached
without notice and comment, “the interests affected would at least have
tion process encompasses not only so-called ‘legislative’ or ‘substantive’ rules . . .
but also procedural rules, interpretative rules and general statements of policy.”).
130. See Mendelson, supra note 9, at 439–40 n.227 (“[T]he few courts to opine
on the issue have . . . [found] that no right to petition an agency to revise or repeal
an interpretive rule or policy statement exists under current law.” (citing Nat’l
Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 128; Atchison, 44 F.3d at 442; United
Transp. Union v. Del. & Hudson Ry., Co., 977 F. Supp. at 574 n.2)).
131. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Pen˜a, the Seventh Circuit
stated that “interested parties do not have the right to petition the agency for re-
view of its interpretive rulings as they do with respect to agency rules.” See Atchison,
44 F.3d at 442 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)).  The Atchison court’s opinion further
stated that the plaintiffs “were not permitted to petition the [agency] for review of
its new interpretation; when they did, the [agency] (properly) informed them that
it was not required to respond.” See id.  In Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Educ. (Nat’l Wrestling I), the District Court for the District of Columbia stated that
§ 553(e) “by its terms, does not apply to interpretive rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice unless notice or
hearing is required by statute.” Nat’l Wrestling I, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)).  The D.C. Circuit affirmed
Nat’l Wrestling I in Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ. (Nat’l Wrestling II).
See Nat’l Wrestling II, 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  Finally, in United Transportation
Union v. Delaware & Hudson Railway Co., the Northern District of New York stated
that “interested parties do not have the right to petition the agency for review of its
interpretive rulings as they do with respect to agency rules.” United Transp. Union,
977 F. Supp. at 574 n.2 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)).
132. In Atchison, the court did not need to reach the issue of whether
§ 553(e) applied to nonlegislative rules because it invalidated the interpretive rule
on its merits, and the court’s brief discussion regarding § 553(e) was only a small
part of its analysis concerning how much deference to afford interpretive rules. See
Atchison, 44 F.3d at 442.  With regard to United Transportation Union, the court was
not even faced with a § 553(e) petition to enact, amend, or repeal a nonlegislative
rule, so any such discussion was dictum. See United Transp. Union, 977 F. Supp. at
574 n.2 (discussing judicial deference afforded agencies’ interpretive rules).  Fi-
nally, in Nat’l Wrestling II, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Nat’l Wrestling I on other
grounds, and while holding that the documents at issue in Nat’l Wrestling I did not
even constitute a valid § 553(e) petition, the D.C. Circuit stated that it was
“[l]eaving aside any difficulties as to whether the [rule at issue] is the type of policy
subject to the APA’s petition requirements.” See Nat’l Wrestling II, 366 F.3d at 948;
see also Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 372 (“[N]one of these opinions considered the
specific language, structure, or legislative history of the APA’s treatment of gui-
dance documents.”).
133. See Guardian Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589
F.2d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“When there has been no procedure for comment
in the first instance, a petition to modify may serve an appropriate objective.”).
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the opportunity to invoke subsection 553(e) of the APA to petition for a
modification, an opportunity in effect to assure some agency considera-
tion of comments.”134
A textual reading of the Petition Provision supports the notion that it
applies to nonlegislative rules.  Section 553(e), by its terms, applies to
“rule[s].”135  A rule is “the whole or a part of an agency statement of gen-
eral or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, proce-
dure, or practice requirements of an agency.”136  Nonlegislative rules
squarely fit within this definition.  A nonlegislative rule can certainly apply
either generally or specifically, and such rules have future effect because
“they provide guidance as to what the agency’s views will be.”137  They
either interpret law or prescribe policy in that they tell “the world how an
agency construes a particular provision in an existing statute.”138  Finally,
while not carrying the force of law, “valid interpretive rules are binding to
the extent that they ‘merely interpret’ already existing legal duties.”139
Accordingly, the term “rule” in the APA refers to both legislative and non-
legislative rules.140
While legislative history is silent on the issue, the Attorney General’s
Manual supports the idea that § 553(e)’s Petition Provision applies to non-
legislative rules.  It states that the Petition Provision “applies not only to
substantive rules but also to interpretations and statements of general pol-
icy, and to organizational and procedural rules.”141  The D.C. Circuit has
noted that, except where inconsistent with the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee’s Report, the Attorney General’s Manual is “entitled to some defer-
134. See id. at 668; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 372 n.220 (citing Guard-
ian Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 589 F.2d at 668).
135. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
136. Id. § 551(4).
137. See FUNK, supra note 6, at 1323; see also Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82
F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Every governmental agency that enforces a less
than crystalline statute must interpret the statute,” and a nonlegislative rule can
announce “the interpretation [of the statute] in advance of enforcement.”); see also
Asimow, supra note 94, at 44 (stating nonlegislative rules explain “to the public and
to agency staff how the agency believes law should be interpreted, discretion
should be exercised, or agency functions carried out”); Funk, supra note 92, at
1322 (“Nonlegislative rules can encompass a wide variety of agency pronounce-
ments.”); Morrison, supra note 18, at 89.
138. See Morrison, supra note 18, at 89.
139. See Gersen, supra note 71, at 1711.
140. See Funk, supra note 92, at 1322 (“[A] ‘rule’ under the APA includes
both ‘interpretative rules’ and ‘general statements of policy’ . . . .” (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4) (2012)).
141. See 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 38. But see Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting “[t]he
Attorney General’s gloss on the APA is entitled to some deference because of the
role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation[,]” except “to
the extent that it is inconsistent with the Senate Committee Report”).
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ence” on the topic.142  The Senate Report also indicates that § 553(e)
applies to nonlegislative rules, stating that “[w]here public rule-making
procedures are dispensed with, the provisions of subsections (c) and (d)
[currently § 553(e)] of this section would nevertheless apply.”143
Section 553’s structure also supports the notion that the Petition Pro-
vision applies to nonlegislative rules,144 upon incorporating expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.145  Had Congress intended to exempt nonlegislative
rules from the Petition Provision, it would have either included a specific
exemption in § 553(e) similar to those in § (b) and § (d), or it would have
included the exemption in § 553(a), which applies to the remainder of
§ 553.146  Section 553(a) exempts certain matters and affairs from all re-
maining subsections of § 553.147  Section 553(b) outlines the APA’s notice
requirements for proposed rulemaking, mandating publication in the Fed-
eral Register, but explicitly exempts nonlegislative rules.148  Section 553(c)
states that “[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making,”149
but because § 553(b) exempts nonlegislative rules from its notice require-
ments, § 553(c)’s provisions are similarly understood not to apply to non-
legislative rules.150  Section 553(d) requires publication of substantive
rules, but also specifically exempts nonlegislative rules.151  Conversely,
§ 553(e) contains no exemptions for nonlegislative rules.152  Thus,
§ 553(e) was not intended to exclude nonlegislative rules.
142. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 606 F.2d at 1043 n.14; see also Norton v. S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (citation omitted) (indicating
Court has “often found [Attorney General’s Manual] persuasive” (citations
omitted)).
143. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 14.
144. See Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 371 n.212 (outlining statutory construc-
tion argument briefly).
145. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002).
146. See Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 371 n.212 (“Read in isolation, it might be
possible for one to interpret the exception in § 553(b) as intending to exempt
guidance documents from all of § 553.  But, the second explicit exemption in sub-
section (d) and the fact that subsection (a) lays out the exemptions to the entire
section deprive this interpretation of any plausibility.”).
147. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (exempting “military or foreign af-
fairs function[s]” and “matter[s] relating to agency management or personnel or
to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts”).
148. See id. § 553(b).
149. Id. § 553(c).
150. See, e.g., 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 30 (noting subsections (a)
and (c) “must be read together because the procedural requirements of subsec-
tion [(c)] apply only where notice is required by subsection (a)”); Seidenfeld,
supra note 9, at 371 n.212 (“[T]here is a consensus that the comment requirement
in subsection (c) does not apply to such [guidance] documents.”).  Note that sub-
sections 4(a) and 4(b) of the public law referred to in the Attorney General’s Man-
ual corresponds to subsections 553(b) and 553(c) of the APA.
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
152. See id. § 553(e) (containing no exemptions).
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss5/1
2016] PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN NONLEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING 781
IV. AGENCIES MUST ADJUDICATE EVERY PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
The APA mandates that administrative agencies must consider and
respond to every petition under § 553(e).  An individual’s right to petition
and an administrative agency’s duties with respect to that petition are gov-
erned by the First Amendment, the APA, and any applicable authorizing
statute for a particular agency.153  The First Amendment provides individ-
uals with the irreducible right to submit petitions to administrative agen-
cies but does not confer any corresponding duty upon agencies to
consider or “respond to” any petitions.154  The First Amendment also pro-
vided the inspiration for the APA’s Petition Provision,155 though Congress
did not believe that the First Amendment sufficiently protected the right
to petition.  Accordingly, Congress provided individuals with greater rights
and protections in the APA, and conferred additional duties upon
agencies.156
A. The First Amendment Guarantees the Right to Petition Agencies
for a Redress of Grievances
The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.”157  Rather than as creating the right to
petition for a redress of grievances, the First Amendment is viewed as
prohibiting the government from “interfering” with an individual’s inher-
153. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 7–11 (summarizing bases for
right to petition); see also U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the [g]overnment for a redress
of grievances.”); 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (“Each agency shall give an interested person
the right to petition . . . .”).
154. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 272 (1984)
(“Nothing in the First Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it sug-
gests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policy-
makers to listen or respond to communications of members of the public on
public issues.”); Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465
(1979) (“[T]he First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on
the government to listen [or] to respond . . . .”).
155. See S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 21 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 SENATE DOCU-
MENT] (“Even Congress, under the Bill of Rights, is required to accord the right of
petition to any citizen.”); 92 CONG. REC. 5651 (1946) (“The right of petition is
written into the Constitution itself.”); see also Luneburg, supra note 127, at 10
(“Such an interpretation of section 553(e) finds support in legislative history ex-
plaining that the [F]irst [A]mendment’s right to petition provided the inspiration
for section 553(e).”).
156. See 1946 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 155, at 21; see also Luneburg,
supra note 127, at 6 (“Congress has seen fit to go beyond the [F]irst
[A]mendment’s strictures . . . .”).
157. See U.S. CONST., amend. I; We the People Found., Inc. v. United States,
485 F.3d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S. CONST., amend. I).
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ent right to petition.158  The First Amendment right to petition serves
three main purposes: (1) “protect[ing] individuals and minority groups by
giving extraordinary power to even a single individual” with the power to
effect change; (2) combating “attenuated representation”; and (3) provid-
ing a mechanism for the people to “inform [those in government] about
local conditions” and “needs.”159
The Supreme Court has concluded that the right to petition is not
limited solely to the “redress of grievances,” but “more broadly” for any-
thing connected with the powers or duties of the government.160  Accord-
ingly, the Court has extended the right to petition to all departments of
the federal government, including administrative agencies.161  However,
the constitutional right to petition an administrative agency for rulemak-
ing does not carry any guarantee of agency consideration or response.162
The Supreme Court has denied any corresponding right at least twice,163
as has the D.C. Circuit.164  One scholar opined that the First Amendment
guarantees “little more than the right to make a clamor.”165
D.C. Circuit Judge Judith Rogers’s concurring opinion in We the People
Foundation, Inc. v. United States166 cites seven law review articles for the
158. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 7 (“[T]he Constitution implies
that the public already and inherently possesses the right [to petition], and so it
merely prohibits the government from interfering with petitions.”).
159. See id. at 7–8 (discussing Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitu-
tion, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991)); see also Amar, supra at 1156.
160. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (referring to
right to petition Congress as “an attribute of national citizenship”); see also
Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 8 (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)) (“The Supreme Court has
interpreted the right as not literally confined to demands for ‘redress of griev-
ances,’ but as more broadly encompassing requests for the exercise of government
power.”).
161. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972) (“The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them
to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of
the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government.”); see also 92 CONG.
REC. 5651 (1946) (stating APA “confirms [the constitutional right to petition]
where Congress has delegated legislative powers to administrative agencies”).
162. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 8.  Schwartz and Revesz identify
case law discussing the lack of a guaranteed governmental response. See id.; see also
Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984); Smith v. Ark.
State Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979); We the People Found., Inc. v.
United States, 485 F.3d 140, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs contend that they
have a right under the First Amendment to receive a government response to or
official consideration of a petition for a redress of grievances.  We disagree.”).
163. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 465 U.S. at 285; see also Ark. State Emps.,
Local 1315, 441 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he First Amendment does not impose any affirma-
tive obligation on the government to listen, to respond . . . .”).
164. Am. Bus Ass’n v. Rogoff, 649 F.3d 734, 739–40 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 465 U.S. at 285); We the People Found., Inc., 485 F.3d
at 143.
165. See Luneburg, supra note 127, at 6.
166. 485 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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proposition that at the time of the First Amendment’s passage, it was un-
derstood to require a governmental response.167  Judge Rogers suggests
that an “interesting question” would arise should the Supreme Court
again consider the question.168  Contemporary case law holds that the
First Amendment right to petition provides the irreducible minimum of
protections afforded, while the APA expands upon these basic rights.
B. The APA’s Expansion of the First Amendment’s Right to Petition
The APA’s Petition Provision was modeled after the First Amend-
ment’s guarantee.169  While it may appear that § 553(e) simply mirrors
the right protected by the First Amendment,170 its text and legislative his-
tory strongly suggest that § 553(e) was intended to confer on individuals a
right to agency consideration and response to all qualifying petitions, and
therefore confer on agencies a corresponding duty to consider and re-
spond to all petitions.
While the First Amendment presumes an inherent right to petition the
government, subsection (e) requires that agencies “give” individuals a
right to petition, suggesting that Congress intended to confer a greater
right.171  The Seventh Circuit noted that the “minimal procedural require-
ment” of a response to a petition “may be implicit in the APA’s structure”
in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Costle.172  The court observed that absent a
corresponding right to receive a response, the right given by § 553(e)
could become meaningless.173  “A statutory outcome is absurd if it defies
rationality,” and courts are keen to avoid giving statutes a reading that
167. See We the People Found., Inc., 485 F.3d at 147–49 (Rogers,J., concurring)
(citing multiple scholars who have argued for this interpretation of First Amend-
ment); see also, e.g., Amar, supra note 159, at 1156 (“[T]he right to petition implied
a corresponding congressional duty to respond . . . .”); James E. Pfander, Sovereign
Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial
Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 899, 905 n.22 (1997) (“[M]ost
scholars agree that the right to petition includes a right to some sort of considered
response.”); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for
a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17, 33
(1993) (“Inherent in the right to petition was a corresponding right to a
response.”).
168. See We the People Found., Inc., 485 F.3d at 149 (Rogers, J., concurring).
169. See 1946 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 155, at 21 (“Even Congress,
under the Bill of Rights, is required to accord the right of petition to any citizen.”);
92 CONG. REC. 5651 (1946) (“The right of petition is written into the Constitution
itself.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (codifying right to petition).
170. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I, with 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); see also Schwartz &
Revesz, supra note 111, at 9.
171. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 9 (stating Section 553(e) “tells
agencies they must ‘give’ the public the right, perhaps revealing the creation of
some new aspect of the right”).
172. See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1983).
173. See id. (“This minimal procedural requirement may be implicit in the
APA’s structure if our review is to be meaningful.”).
25
Gavoor and Miktus: Public Participation in Nonlegislative Rulemaking
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
784 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 759
would lead to “absurd results.”174  Effectively decimating the § 553(e)
right to petition by permitting agencies to ignore petitions would create
such an irrational and absurd result.  Accordingly, § 553(e) was likely in-
tended to provide greater rights than those already provided by the First
Amendment—the right to agency consideration of, and response to, all
§ 553(e) petitions.
Legislative history provides a strong indication that Congress in-
tended for agencies to consider and respond to each petition.  A 1945
Report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that “[w]here
such petitions are made, the agency must fully and promptly consider
them, [and] take such action as may be required.”175  The Senate Report
then gave agencies three options: “grant the petition, undertake public
rule making proceedings . . . or deny the petition.”176  A 1946 Report from
the House Committee on the Judiciary echoed this view, stating that
“[w]here such petitions are made, the agency must fully and promptly
consider them . . . .”177  Moreover, proceedings in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate suggested that agencies could not simply receive
petitions in a “pro forma manner,”178 and sought to require that each
agency establish procedures for the consideration and adjudication of
petitions.179
C. The Petition Provision’s Context in the APA Suggests That Agencies Are
Required to Consider and Respond to Every Petition
The context of the APA’s Petition Provision suggests that an agency
must consider and respond to every petition it receives.  Two subsections of
§ 555 highlight this agency duty.  Section 555(b) states that “[w]ith due
regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their represent-
174. See Landstar Express Am., Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 569 F.3d 493, 498
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“When statutory language reasonably admits of alternative constructions, there is
nothing remarkable about resolving the textual ambiguity against the alternative
meaning that produces a result the framers are highly unlikely to have intended.
We choose the reasonable result over the ‘absurd’ one.”); see also John F. Manning,
The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2003) (“Over the years, in
countless decisions—many of them well known—the [Supreme Court] has ad-
justed unambiguous statutory commands to avoid absurd results.”).
175. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 201.  The Report
further states that Petition Provision “requires the reception and consideration of
petitions.” See id. at 226; see also WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 813 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (noting legislative history “makes it plain that an agency must receive and
respond to petitions for rulemaking”).
176. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 201.
177. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 260 (1946).
178. See 92 CONG. REC. 5651 (1946).
179. See id.; see also 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 38 (“Every agency
with rule making powers . . . should establish, and publish . . . procedural rules
governing the receipt, consideration and disposition of petitions filed pursuant to
section [553(e)].”).
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atives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to con-
clude a matter presented to it.”180  Section 555(e) states that “[p]rompt
notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written applica-
tion, petition, or other request.”181  Taken together, these statements
mandate that agencies must “conclude” all matters presented to them, in-
cluding petitions, “within a reasonable time,” and that if the agency de-
cides not to issue, amend, or repeal a rule, it must notify the petitioner
promptly of that denial.  In the petition context, the language of § 555(b)
clarifies that agencies remain free to arrange their agendas and priorities
as they see fit, so long as a petition is not ignored for an unreasonable
time.182  The remainder of § 555(b) requires an agency to “conclude” a
petition, either by granting or denying the § 553(e) petition.183  Accord-
ingly, within a reasonable time, an agency must grant or deny every petition
under § 553(e).
If an agency grants a petition under § 553(e) by issuing, amending, or
repealing a rule, the petitioner would receive at least constructive notice
through publication in the Federal Register (either thirty days before
promulgating the legislative rule or upon issuance for a nonlegislative
rule).184  If the agency were to deny a petition, in whole or in part,
§ 555(e) explicitly requires that the agency “prompt[ly]” notify the peti-
tioner.185  Therefore, if the agency grants or denies a § 553(e) petition,
the petitioner will receive notice.  Accordingly, § 555(b) and § 555(e), in
conjunction, require that agencies, within a reasonable time, consider and
respond to every petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
D. Contemporary Case Law Suggests a Requirement
to Adjudicate Each Petition
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, various courts
have held that agencies must, at a minimum, respond to every petition for
rulemaking.  The D.C. Circuit stated that the APA’s legislative history
“makes it plain that an agency must receive and respond to petitions for
rulemaking.”186  A Ninth Circuit panel observed that an agency re-
sponded to a nonlegislative rulemaking petition “as it must under the
180. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012).
181. Id. § 555(e).
182. See id. § 555(b); see also Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 13 (“Courts
have repeatedly cited § 555(b) . . . to apply a standard of reasonableness to review
delayed responses on petitions for rulemaking.”).  A discussion of what courts have
considered an unreasonable amount of time is addressed below in Section IV.
183. See Luneburg, supra note 127, at 9 (“[S]ection 555(b) requires final dis-
position by grant or denial.”).
184. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
185. See id. § 555(e).
186. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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[APA].”187  District judges in both the District of the District of Columbia
and the Southern District of New York have held that agencies are “re-
quired to at least definitively respond to . . . petition[s]—that is, to either
deny or grant the petition[s].”188  Moreover, it appears that the majority
of commentators to opine on the issue believe that the APA’s Petition Pro-
vision requires agencies to consider and respond to each petition.189
V. ADJUDICATIVE INACTION AND UNREASONABLE DELAY OF A RULEMAKING
PETITION ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Agency inaction or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a § 553(e) pe-
tition is explicitly justiciable, and courts should uniformly employ the D.C.
Circuit’s TRAC test in this analysis.  Upon the receipt of a rulemaking peti-
tion, an agency will either grant it, delay or fail to adjudicate it, or deny
it.190  If the agency grants the petition, the petitioner will likely not seek to
litigate the issue, though an adversely affected third party might.191  In
each other scenario, however, an individual’s rights are not conclusively
established under current law.192  If an agency fails to adjudicate or delays
unreasonably in adjudicating a petition, courts uniformly accept that the
petitioner has the right to review, but there is no uniform standard of
review.  If an agency denies a petition, the petitioner likely lacks a right of
review altogether.  Such a lack of clear rights could cause the right to peti-
187. See Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 494 F. App’x 774, 776–77 (9th Cir.
2012) (concluding U.S. Department of Agriculture failed to provide sufficient ex-
planation “of its reasons for denying [ ] rulemaking petition”).
188. See Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 794 F.
Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Families for Freedom, 628 F. Supp. 2d at
540).
189. See Pfander, supra note 167, at 905 n.22 (stating that “[a]s a matter of
history, most scholars agree that the right to petition includes a right to some sort
of considered response” and listing number of scholars who have argued as such);
see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10 (4th ed. 2002)
(“At a minimum, the right to petition for rulemaking entitles a petitioning party to
a response to the merits of the petition.”).
190. These agency actions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  For exam-
ple, an agency may unreasonably delay and then grant or deny the petition.
191. Disagreement exists as to exactly what it means to “grant” a petition.
The majority view is that a petition is granted when the agency issues an NPRM,
while the minority view is that a grant “occurs only with rule adoption.” See
Luneburg, supra note 127, at 13.  This Article rejects the majority view because it
solely contemplates the granting of a legislative rule.  This Article specifically ar-
gues that an agency could potentially grant a petition to enact a nonlegislative
rule, which would not require an NPRM under the APA.  Further, “courts can
review both the termination of an ongoing rulemaking and delay in finalizing a
rulemaking that was intended to respond to a petition . . . . [and] may treat the
cessation of a rulemaking with more scrutiny than a straight denial of a petition.”
See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 26 (footnote omitted).
192. See Bull, supra note 11, at 304 (“The case law addressing appeals of
agency dispositions of petitions for rulemaking has been somewhat vague concern-
ing the standard of review that courts will apply.”).
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tion to become meaningless.193  Courts should uniformly apply the D.C.
Circuit’s TRAC test to resolve challenges of agency delay and inaction, and
also acknowledge that denials of rulemaking petitions are not per se fore-
closed from substantive review.194
As explained above in Section III.C, § 555(b) and § 555(e), in con-
junction, require that an agency adjudicate and respond to every petition
within a reasonable time.195  Section 706 gives this statutory right teeth,
providing that district courts “shall [ ] compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”196  Accordingly, an agency’s inaction
or unreasonable delay in adjudicating a § 553(e) petition is explicitly justi-
ciable under the APA.
Courts uniformly acknowledge that they have the power to compel an
agency to adjudicate a petition for rulemaking.197  In particular, the D.C.
Circuit consistently signals its willingness to compel an agency to adjudi-
cate a petition after an unreasonable delay, in an effort to correct “trans-
parent violations of a clear duty to act.”198  Commentators note that in
many cases of agency inaction, courts are hesitant to second-guess agency
193. See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1983).
194. The task of establishing a comprehensive limiting principle for such re-
view is not in the scope of this Article’s inquiry.
195. See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (emphasis added); In re. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 645 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[I]n cases brought under APA
§ 706(1) . . . jurisdiction lies in the district court.” (citations omitted) (citing
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1099–100
(D.C. Cir. 2003))); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Novitch, 583 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C.
1984)). But see Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (con-
cluding judicial review under APA § 706(1) “can proceed only where a plaintiff
asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take”
as opposed to broad programmatic attack).
197. See, e.g., In re Pesticide Action Network N. Am., 532 F. App’x 649, 650
(9th Cir. 2013); In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (“[W]e will interfere with the normal progression of agency proceed-
ings to correct ‘transparent violations of a clear duty to act’ . . . .” (quoting In re
Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000))); Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e hold that OSHA’s delay
in promulgating a [rule] has exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.  We there-
fore grant [petitioner’s] petition to compel [the agency] to proceed expeditiously
with its . . . rulemaking.”); Towns of Wellesley, Concord, & Norwood, Mass. v.
FERC, 829 F.2d 275, 277 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[W]e find that the timing of the FERC’s
actions in fashioning a final order is not so ‘egregious’ as to warrant mandamus.”);
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 794 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C.
2011); Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); see also Morrison, supra note 18, at 96 (“[C]ourts uniformly recognize that at
some point, they have the power to require agencies to reach a final decision on a
request for rulemaking . . . .”).  Morrison notes, however, that courts “have shown a
reluctance to do so except in extreme cases.” See id.
198. See In re Am. Rivers, 372 F.3d at 418 (quoting In re Bluewater Network, 234
F.3d at 1315) (noting that “[a]n administrative agency’s unreasonable delay
presents such a circumstance because it signals the ‘breakdown of regulatory
processes’” (citing Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 897 n.156 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
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priorities,199 yet judicial review remains an available remedy when agen-
cies fail to act or delay unreasonably in adjudicating a petition.
The APA is silent as to the standard of review a court should employ
when deciding claims of agency inaction or delay.200  The APA uses the
terms “reasonable time” and “unreasonably delayed,” but fails to define
these terms.201  Similarly, the Supreme Court has yet to define these terms
or declare a standard of review that should be employed when reviewing
agency inaction or delay.202  In the circuit courts, however, the most com-
monly used test is the “TRAC test,” first set out by the D.C. Circuit in Tele-
communications Research and Action Center v. FCC.203
199. See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 16, at 27 (“[J]udges have been reluc-
tant to second-guess the lack of a response, instead deferring to agency agenda-
setting.”).
200. See generally APA, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
201. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1); see also LUBBERS, supra note 33, at 44
(“[T]he APA’s definitional structure is largely circular . . . .”).
202. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal–Agent Ap-
proach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1411 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has never addressed
how a court should assess agency delay . . . .”).
203. 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The analysis set forth in Telecomms. Research
& Action Center v. FCC (TRAC) has since been followed by the First Circuit in Towns
of Wellesley, Concord, & Norwood, Mass. v. FERC, 829 F.2d 275, 277 (1st Cir. 1987);
the Fourth Circuit in In re City of Va. Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 885 (4th Cir. 1994); the
Fifth Circuit in Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n Inc. v. OSHA, 903 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir.
1990); the Ninth Circuit in Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001);
and the Tenth Circuit in Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d 1261, 1272–73 (10th
Cir. 1998).  While some circuit courts do not employ the TRAC Test, “[n]o court
has rejected TRAC’s reasoning.” See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 14 n.62.
The Third Circuit uses a four-part test that looks to the following factors:
First, the court should ascertain the length of time that has elapsed since
the agency came under a duty to act.  Second, the reasonableness of the
delay should be judged in the context of the statute authorizing the
agency’s action.  Third, the court should assess the consequences of the
agency’s delay.  Fourth, the court should consider any plea of administra-
tive error, administrative inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying
out a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the face of limited
resources.
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania has explicitly held that, because it is bound by Third Circuit
precedent, it would employ the OCAWU test instead of the D.C. Circuit’s TRAC
test. See Karimushan v. Chertoff, Civil Action No. 07–2995, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47167, at *7–8 n.4 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2008).  Additionally, the Second Circuit has
never cited TRAC or used it in an agency delay decision, but has rather looked to
“the source of delay,” analyzing “the complexity of the investigation as well as the
extent to which the defendant participated in delaying the proceeding.” See Reddy
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 191 F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 35).  However, district courts within
the Second Circuit have, in fact, used the TRAC Test when analyzing claims of
agency delay. See, e.g., Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F. Supp. 2d 535,
540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212,
231–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531,
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In TRAC, the D.C. Circuit noted that while it had decided several un-
reasonable delay cases, it had not selected one particular test to reach
those conclusions.204  The court realized however, that these cases formed
“the hexagonal contours of a standard.”205  While acknowledging that the
standard “is hardly ironclad [ ] and sometimes suffers from vagueness,”
the TRAC court opined that it would provide “useful guidance” for courts
reviewing agency inaction or delay.206  In assessing claims of agency delay,
the D.C. Circuit instructed courts to look to six factors:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed
by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable
or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency
to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may
supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be
reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolera-
ble when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court
should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on
agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court
should also take into account the nature and extent of the inter-
ests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any
impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that
agency action is unreasonably delayed.207
The D.C. Circuit has provided little explanation of these factors or
their relationship to one another.208  That being said, the court has stated
that the first factor is “the most important.”209  The court also explained
that the third factor is not as important when most or all of the agency’s
docket pertains to human health and welfare.210  As to the fourth factor,
the court has hesitated to compel an agency to prioritize one particular
petition, because this “simply moves all others back one space and pro-
543–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
204. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79.
205. See id. at 80.
206. See id.
207. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 202, at 1412 (noting D.C. Circuit has
“never attempted to explain the relationship between the factors”); see also
Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 14 (quoting Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 202,
at 1412).
209. See In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The
first and most important factor is that the time agencies take to make decisions
must be governed by a rule of reason.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
210. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (analyzing
alleged EPA delay and stating that “although this court has required greater
agency promptness as to actions involving interests relating to human health and
welfare . . . this factor alone can hardly be considered dispositive when . . . the
entire docket of the agency involves issues of this type”).
31
Gavoor and Miktus: Public Participation in Nonlegislative Rulemaking
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
790 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 759
duces no net gain.”211  Finally, the D.C. Circuit has briefly explained the
sixth factor, noting that courts are less likely to defer to agencies’ stated
priorities where it appears the agency has acted in bad faith.212
Because applying the TRAC test is so “fact-specific” and flexible, court
rulings on agency delay vary widely.213  The D.C. Circuit has stated that,
while there is no “per se rule” in analyzing agency delay, “a reasonable
time for agency action is typically counted in weeks or months, not
years.”214  However, a 2014 Administrative Conference of the United
States Final Report (the Report) asserts that courts will typically not find
an unreasonable delay until several years have passed.215  The Report
notes that, while in one case, a delay of “essentially five months” was con-
sidered unreasonable,216 the Third Circuit also found a six-year delay to
be reasonable based on “competing priorities, limited resources, and the
need for scientific research.”217  However, the Third Circuit reached this
decision using a test other than the TRAC test.218  The Report also points
out that a five-year delay was considered “unreasonable[ ] on its face[,]” a
six-year delay was “found to be nothing less than egregious,” and a nine-
211. See In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  The court
believed it had “no basis for reordering agency priorities,” and stated that “[i]n
one of the exceptionally rare cases where this court has actually issued an order
compelling an agency to press forward with a specific project we were persuaded,
largely by agency concessions, that the project backed by plaintiff was plainly more
urgent than any that the project’s acceleration might [delay].” Id. at 76 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schwartz & Revesz, supra note
111, at 14 n.62.
212. See In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 75 (“Where the agency has manifested
bad faith, as by singling someone out for bad treatment or asserting utter indiffer-
ence to a congressional deadline, the agency will have a hard time claiming legiti-
macy for its priorities.”).
213. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 15.
214. See In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (citing Midwest Gas Users Ass’n v. FERC, 833 F.2d 341, 359 (D.C. Cir.
1987)); see also Midwest Gas Users, 833 F.2d at 359 (“[A] reasonable time for an
agency decision could encompass months, occasionally a year or two, but not sev-
eral years or a decade.” (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
215. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 15 (“More typically, it takes
several years before a court will likely find a delay to be unreasonable . . . .”).
216. See id. (citing Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C.
1985)).  In Heckler, the District Court for the District of Columbia found this delay
unreasonable because of a consensus regarding the danger of consuming raw
milk. See Heckler, 602 F. Supp. at 613.
217. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 16 (citing Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Union v. OSHA (OCAWU), 145 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also
generally OCAWU, 145 F.3d 120.
218. See OCAWU, 145 F.3d at 123 (indicating unreasonable delay should be
measured by the following factors: (1) length of delay; (2) context of delay as
judged by agency’s authorizing statute; (3) “the consequences of the agency’s de-
lay”; and (4) “any plea of administrative error, inconvenience, [or] practical diffi-
culty” (citing Raymond Proffitt Found. v. EPA, 930 F.Supp. 1088, 1102 (E.D. Pa.
1996))).
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year delay was “objectively extreme.”219  However, even when a court finds
that an agency has failed to act or has delayed unreasonably, it is very
unlikely to force the agency to grant the petition; rather, it “typically will
ask the agency for a timetable concerning when it can respond, thereby
adding additional delay.”220
One critic of the TRAC Test asserts that “courts can use the TRAC
analysis to support virtually any conclusion they want to reach,”221 arguing
that the TRAC Test “makes no attempt to distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate causes of delay, . . . specific versus broad statutory man-
dates, or decisions about priorities versus substantive action,” and that
“[t]he analysis thus ignores the way in which delays undermine the demo-
cratic accountability of the administrative state.”222
Contrary to this criticism however, the TRAC Test focuses on the ways
agency inaction and unreasonable delay undermine the democratic ac-
countability of administrative agencies, while providing courts with a use-
ful blueprint for evaluating agency inaction and delays.  Congress did not
codify the exact timeframe for an agency to respond to every type of peti-
tion concerning every subject, likely because doing so would have been
unworkable and “undesirable.”223  The TRAC test fills the void of the
APA’s definitional omission and provides courts with the freedom to evalu-
ate all the facts of a case.  Thus, the TRAC test is a structure that can guide
judicial oversight of agency delays and whether they undermine demo-
cratic accountability, or instead evince the existence of excusable delay
due to administrative burden or other higher administrative priorities.
While not laid out explicitly, as with agency inaction or unreasonable
delay, § 553(e) petitioners should have the right to challenge some agency
denials of petitions under limited circumstances.224  The Petition Provi-
sion’s context and legislative history suggest that denials could be subject
to judicial review,225 and in reaching its decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA,226 the Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged that petition denials
219. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 16 nn.78, 79 & 81 (citing In re
Am. Rivers, 372 F.3d at 419; Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 113
(D.D.C. 2003); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 154, 158
(3d Cir. 2002) (declining to apply TRAC Test)).
220. See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 16, at 27.
221. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 202, at 1413.
222. See id.
223. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION 86-6, supra note 10, at 1.
224. Permitting judicial review of some petition denials is important because
“[a]gencies often counter a petitioner’s initiation of unreasonable delay litigation
by issuing a response (usually a denial), and courts have typically found that such
action moots the unreasonable delay complaint.” See Schwartz & Revesz, supra
note 111, at 17.
225. See 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 201 (“The refusal of
an agency to grant the petition or to hold rule making proceedings, therefore,
would not per se be subject to judicial reversal.”).
226. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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were justiciable.227  The Court has not delineated exactly if and when de-
nials are reviewable, though the lower courts have occasionally permitted
such review.228  In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC),229
the D.C. Circuit observed that review of a petition denial may be available
where an agency has undergone “rulemaking proceedings narrowly fo-
cused on the particular rule at issue, and has explained in detail its rea-
sons for not adopting [that] rule[ ].”230  In the same opinion, the court
also opined that § 553(e) petition denials are generally “ill-suited” for judi-
cial review due to the frequent absence of the aforementioned circum-
stances.231  Legislative history supports the notion that some agency
denials of rulemaking petitions are subject to judicial review.  A 1945 Re-
port from the Senate Judiciary Committee says that “[t]he refusal of an
agency to grant the petition or to hold rule making proceedings, there-
fore, would not per se be subject to judicial reversal.”232  The NRDC court
interpreted this language to imply a right to judicial review.233
Two years after NRDC, the D.C. Circuit stated that it “reject[s] the
suggestion that agency denials of requests for rulemaking are exempt
from judicial review.”234  The court noted that “an agency may be forced
by a reviewing court to institute rulemaking proceedings if a significant
factual predicate of a prior decision on the subject (either to promulgate
or not to promulgate specific rules) has been removed.”235  Other circuits
have also observed that agency rulemaking denials are subject to judicial
review, albeit at a very deferential level “akin to non-reviewability.”236
227. See id. at 533–35 (ordering EPA to revisit and reevaluate § 553(e) peti-
tion it had previously denied); see also Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 111, at 29
(discussing Massachusetts v. EPA).
228. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (“Because we find the [SEC’s] action [in denying a petition] sustainable
under the scope of judicial review applicable to this case, we reverse.”).
229. 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
230. See id. at 1047.
231. See id. at 1046 (“An agency’s discretionary decision [n]ot to regulate a
given activity is inevitably based, in large measure, on factors not inherently suscep-
tible to judicial resolution . . . . [and] even if an agency considers a particular
problem worthy of regulation, it may determine for reasons lying within its special
expertise that the time for action has not yet arrived.” (citation omitted)).
232. 1945 SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 201.
233. See NRDC, 606 F.2d at 1043 n.14 (“[T]his language implies that judicial
review would sometimes be available in the circumstances mentioned.”).
234. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  However,
the D.C. Circuit’s case law does not “support a general rule that discretionary
agency decisions not to adopt rules are reviewable [p]er se,” and “the relevant
factors incline against reviewability.” See NRDC, 606 F.2d at 1047.
235. See WWHT, 656 F.2d at 819.
236. See New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 554 (2d
Cir. 2009) (citing Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1992)); see also Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227, 234 (5th Cir.
2015) (“[T]he better reading is that these denials are presumptively reviewable,
subject to Congressional language clearly to the contrary . . . .”); Conservancy of
Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2012).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Congress’s main goals in enacting the APA included “keep[ing] the
public currently informed” of agency procedure and rules, permitting
“public participation in the rulemaking process,” and formulating “uni-
form standards” of judicial review for agency action or inaction.237  To
foster some of these goals, the APA included § 553(e), which requires
agencies to “give all interested person[s] the right to petition for the issu-
ance, amendment, or repeal” of administrative rules.238  Under the con-
flicting and confusing case law, disagreement exists regarding the proper
scope and interpretation of the Petition Provision.
While interested persons may submit petitions for legislative rulemak-
ing, courts and the literature disagree as to whether agencies must allow
individuals to submit petitions regarding nonlegislative rules.239  However,
a variety of interpretive tools establish that the guarantee of § 553(e) cov-
ers all petitions, both legislative and nonlegislative in nature.  Even when
an agency accepts a petition, there is no consensus regarding which proce-
dures, if any, an agency must follow in considering and responding.  If
agencies can either refuse to accept petitions regarding nonlegislative
rules or indefinitely delay adjudicating petitions for either type of informal
rule, they would then have the power to promulgate regulations with the
force of law with no public participation or inclusion whatsoever.  The
Framers of the Constitution and the drafters of the APA envisioned a sys-
tem where the public should participate in crafting federal law and where
courts should be the final arbiters of the legality of those laws.  The cur-
rent system does not hold true to these sentiments.
To ensure that individuals remain able to participate in the legislative
process when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agencies, the
APA mandated that agencies accept all petitions for informal rulemaking,
both legislative and nonlegislative, and adjudicate each qualifying petition
within a reasonable period of time.  Agency inaction or unreasonable de-
lay in adjudicating a petition is subject to judicial review, with a standard
of review best elucidated by the D.C. Circuit’s TRAC test.  Denials of such
petitions are not per se substantively unreviewable, though such review
may be available only in limited circumstances.
The Constitution and the APA amply demonstrate the value that the
Framers and Congress placed not only on public participation in the crea-
tion of federal law, but also the role of the judiciary in reviewing those laws
and the procedures used to promulgate them.240  Failure to uphold these
237. See 1947 AG’S MANUAL, supra note 48, at 9; see also Hunnicutt, supra note
20, at 153–54.
238. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
239. For an argument that APA § 553(e) applies to both legislative and non-
legislative rules, see Seidenfeld, supra note 9.  For an argument that APA § 553(e)
applies only to legislative rules, see Mendelson, supra note 9.
240. See generally Morrison, supra note 18, at 92 (“APA rulemaking as supple-
mented by judicial review over the procedural and substantive aspects of a final
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rights and values could render individuals excluded altogether from a crit-
ical aspect of the nation’s process of federal lawmaking.
rule does, as a practical matter, compensate for the absence of political checks that
are a central feature of the legislative process.”).
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